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NOW UNDER NEW ADMINISTRATION: 
FISHING AGREEMENTS IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON FLOODPLAINS




This text analyzes recent experiences of participatory grassroots management of 
fisheries in the Brazilian Amazon basin. It describes and interprets major provisions of 
specific fishing agreements. The approach reports to common pool resource theory, as 
developed by Ostrom (1990). Participatory management is defined as mutually agreed 
natural resource uses, designed with community participation, and aimed at securing 
resource availability in the contexts of ecological balance, sustainable economic output 
and community welfare. The goals are (i) to present experiences in which community 
initiatives are adopted into an evolving institutional framework for co-management; (ii) 
to evaluate their progress to date; and (iii) to outline the key issues to be addressed in 
order to improve and consolidate these initiatives, and similar ones.
Intensive fishing in Amazonian floodplains generates conflicts in two complemen-
tary dimensions. The first is related to the sustainability of the resource, reflecting the 
contradiction between economy and ecology. The second expresses the distinct interests 
and perspectives of local stakeholders in respect to outsiders who have access to the re-
source. In this context, traditional forms of managing the commons are vulnerable. This 
calls for new and more effective arrangements.
Participatory management (or co-management) of fisheries in the region falls, 
locally, under the general designation of fishing agreements (“acordos de pesca”). They 
are generated and recognized by some Amazonian communities and are valid for selected 
lakes. They are an important tool to control unregulated access and the resulting degra-
dation of the resource. Agreements are a step in the direction of achieving a compromise 
between individual and collective interests, generating benefits in both dimensions. IBA-
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MA (Brazil’s major environmental agency) and the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture 
(MPA) had not yet created effective regulations designed to limit access to lakes.
This issue has increasing relevance to public policies that try to define access rights 
to aquatic resources in lakes and rivers throughout the ecosystem (Oviedo & Ruffino, 
2003). Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither 
has succeeded in solving common-pool resource problems. Over the last two decades, 
a growing number of authors and organizations, in different contexts around the world, 
have developed grassroots management models.
Participatory management, by incorporating resource users, is seen by some as the 
most effective way of solving many of the problems associated with the conventional 
scientific model of fisheries management. Agrawal et al. (2013) analyzed the effects of 
norms, organizations and their rules in forestry communities. They argued that with an 
appropriate network structure of management, a small group can generate sustainable 
use of common-pool resource. This is particularly valid for cases involving resource de-
pletion, conflicts among user groups and the design of adequate policies (McGoodwin, 
1990; Jentoft  & McCay, 1995).
The modes of participatory management that evolved in the Amazonian floodplains 
result from social learning processes involving local initiatives, governments, universities, 
NGO’s and international funding agencies (Oviedo, 2011). Social learning has created 
opportunity for improved understanding of resource conservation innovations and for 
reduced hierarchy among actors. It has also created space for the application of both in-
digenous and scientific knowledge in the innovation process (Dessie et al., 2013). Though 
still largely an experimental approach, being tested in a few areas, implementation has 
advanced enough to allow the examination of the main outlines of this emerging system. 
This article is based on specialized literature and on empirical observations and 
surveys made in several sections of the Amazon region, Brazil. 
2. Geographical and institutional settings
Each year, the Amazon River and its tributaries overflow the banks of their exten-
sive lower sections and flood an immense area estimated at 64,591,108 hectares (Figure 
1). These floodplains are the most extensive on Earth. For almost six months of the year, 
waters rise 10 to 15 m (Junk et al., 1989), submerging the surrounding forests and creating 
an aquatic ecosystem uniquely dependent upon such periodic flooding. Floodplains are 
used by unique creatures such as the world’s largest freshwater fish, “pirarucu” (Arapaima 
gigas), the pink river dolphin (Inia geoffrensis), the giant river otter (Pteronura brasiliensis), 
the black caiman (Melanosuchus niger) and the Amazonian manatee (Trichechus inunguis), 
besides scores of fruit-eating fish species that dwell in between the partially submerged 
tree trunks. Researchers have catalogued hundreds of species of fish and birds, a wide 
range of mammals, reptiles and amphibians, and an exceptional diversity of trees to be 
found in this unique ecosystem (Henderson & Robertson, 1999; Ayres, 1994; Borges, et 
al. 2004; Goulding, 1980).
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Figure 1: Floodplains in the Brazilian Amazon
Source: IBGE Census 2010
From the perspective of Amazonian riverside populations engaged in resource 
management, floodplains have four major landscape components: main river channels, 
forested natural levees bordering these channels, permanent floodplain lakes occupying 
much of the floodplain interior, and seasonally inundated grasslands that cover the 
transitional zone between levees and lakes (Figure 2). Lakes actually form networks, 
varying in size and permanence (some dry out during the non-flood season). They can 
cover quite large areas and vary considerably in size, environmental characteristics and 
resource abundance.
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Figure 2: Environment and land uses in the lower Amazon River floodplains
Source: Adapted from McGrath et al. (2000) by S. Nasuti.
Land tenure reflects the patterns of resource use. Private property is generally le-
gitimized. Properties are measured in terms of meters of frontage along the flooded rivers 
and extend inland to include lakes or canals. This system guarantees that each household 
will have access to the four aforementioned ecotopes. While private properties are re-
cognized, there is a gradient from private to collective property land use as one moves 
inland from levees to interior lakes. Levees, where virtually all household infrastructure is 
concentrated, are clearly demarcated. Grasslands, while nominally private property, tend 
to be treated as a commons on which all owners may graze their cattle. Inland lakes are 
also regarded as the common property of those who own the land around their borders, 
either communities or large ranchers (McGrath et al., 2000). Authors such as Castelo et 
al. (2013) claim that there is an urgent need to shift the Amazon conservation paradigm, 
broadening its current “forest-centric” focus to encompass the freshwater ecosystems that 
are vital components of the basin.
Public policies that seek the conservation of aquatic and fishery resources in the 
Amazon region have been polarized between using the strong arm of state interven-
tion and plain omission in which individual initiatives flourish in the absence of state 
regulations. We are still far from knowing with an acceptable degree of confidence the 
real resource potentials and limitations of the Amazon region (Sayago et al., 2003). 
Community-based solutions have been underestimated on account of the prevalence of 
individualistic behaviors and practices, typical of situations in which state regulations are 
not effective. In this context, the metaphor of the “tragedy of the commons” proposed 
by Hardin (1968) is an important reference (McGrath, 2000). The implementation of 
strategies that integrate conservation and development is a real challenge in this kind of 
natural environment. Small-scale fishing communities are often left out of governmental 
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strategies, either because they lack organization, or they are mobile, or because planners 
do not duly appreciate the importance of fisheries to them.
Also in accordance with historical patterns, fish is a crucial component of the diet 
of riverside populations. Modern capture and conservation techniques and more efficient 
modes of transportation have allowed fishing to move from the limited spheres of subsis-
tence and local markets to larger commercial markets. As a result, since the 1990s both 
the quantity and the quality of catch in the region are decreasing. Stocks of some of the 
most traditional species, such as the “pirarucu”, “tambaqui” (Colossoma macropomum), 
and the catfish “piramutaba” (Brachyplatystoma vaillantii) are now suffering a fishing-down 
process (Castello et al., 2011a; Castello & Stewart, 2010; Isaac et al., 1998; Welcomme, 
1999; Isaac & Ruffino, 1996; Barthem & Petrere, 1995; Neves, 1995; Barthem, 1990). In 
addition, stocks of regionally important species such as the small catfish “mandi” (Pimelodus 
cf. Altipinnis) in Acre state are threatened by overfishing (Oviedo, 2011).
3. A new fishing management model
The currently dominant model in the Brazilian fishing sector was established in 
the 1960s and maintained all the way to the late 1990s by the federal Fishing Authority 
– SUDEPE and its successor agency, IBAMA. It was concerned above all with increasing 
production, with little if any concern with the sustainability of fishing stocks. The model 
did not address social, cultural and environmental dimensions. This mode of regulation 
was based on incomplete statistics and reflected the weak regulatory control over the 
activity. Governance had two traits during this period: political authoritarianism and the 
prevalence of economic growth strategies over all other aspects (Oviedo, 2006).
Since the mid-1980s, though, re-democratization brought about changes in the 
role of the government. There has been a strong trend towards the decentralization of 
several public policies previously under the sole responsibility of the federal government. 
In a country of continental proportions, the end of the dictatorship prompted the belief 
that governability would be more effective if it was more focused on regional and local 
levels. Laws and norms on matters such as forestry, hunting, fishing, land use, conservation, 
environmental protection and pollution control became increasingly decentralized. This 
has been an opportunity for introducing more effective governmental action in terms of 
regulation, execution and control.
IBAMA was created in 1989 and inherited, among other functions, SUDEPE’s 
role in the regulation of fisheries. Despite its track record of administrative discontinuity 
and institutional fragility, IBAMA was forced to assume a more dynamic role, in order to 
respond to strong social and political demands. The agency adopted management models 
aimed at the integrated or participatory administration of activities, carried out in speci-
fic ecosystems. In this context, in 1992 IBAMA’s Fishing and Aquaculture Department 
(DEPAQ) implemented the River Basin Fishing Organization Program. During the first 
years of the DEPAQ program, adequate instruments were not clearly known. Actions 
focused on federal fishing regulations. However, there emerged the perception of the 
need to include the relevant federal, state and municipal institutions, and civil society 
organizations in the decision-making process. 
Ambiente & Sociedade  n  São Paulo v. XVIII, n. 4  n  p. 113-132  n out.-dez. 2015  
118 Oviedo, Bursztyn and Drummond
The 1934 Brazilian Water Code (Decree 24.643, July 10, 1934, still valid for many 
purposes) defines floodplains, wetlands, river embankments, canals and lakes as public 
areas, allowing their use by riverside populations, especially small farmers and dwellers, as 
long as their activities does not interfere with the public interest. The more recent Water 
Resources Law (Law 9.433, January 9, 1997) established a new national water policy based 
on the following principles: water is to be treated as a public good pertaining to the public 
domain; it is endowed with economic value; its availability is limited; its priority use is for 
human consumption; catchment basins are the basic planning and management units; 
planning and management should allow for multiple uses and should be decentralized, 
involving government, users and local communities. Other laws, issued in 1967 and 1998, 
regulate fishing activities and empower IBAMA to produce specific ordinances.
Starting in 1996, local IBAMA offices gained more autonomy to set fishing regu-
lations. An example is the 2002 ordinance issued by IBAMA’s Amazonas state office, 
dealing with sport, recreational and subsistence fishing. Another example is the 2002 
rule that establishes a zoning of lake systems in the municipality of Lábrea (Figure 1), 
defining which lakes are to be set aside for stock maintenance and breeding, besides 
associated user rules and penalties. Such decentralization has reached the municipal 
level, as happened, for example, in the municipality of Silves (Figure 1). In 2000 IBAMA 
published a local ordinance zoning the lakes within its territory. It designated different 
lakes for different roles, such as breeding, subsistence fishing and commercial fishing. 
This statute also created a Municipal Control Council, in charge of enforcement and 
application of penalties. In 2005, the municipal government of Manoel Urbano (Figure 1) 
organized a local fishery forum to collect proposals from community representatives and 
draft fishing agreement proposals to be submitted to IBAMA. The proposals established 
multi-species management rules and specific regulations for “pirarucu” management in 
target lakes (Oviedo, 2006). 
Difficulties in enforcement limit the effects of these regulations. IBAMA and the 
Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture (MPA) have overlapping roles and related respon-
sibilities. This confusion was clarified with the Fisheries Law of 2009 and the Law 140 of 
2011, which transfers responsibility for managing inland fisheries to state governments. 
Also, both institutions are usually short on human and financial resources and lack the 
energy to maintain effective control in a region as vast as Amazonia. In 2000, IBAMA 
took an important step towards the implementation of participatory management of floo-
dplain resources in the region. Supported by international organizations, the Ministry of 
the Environment and IBAMA initiated the Natural Floodplain Resources Management 
Project - Pro-Várzea. Its goal was to create technical and political bases for the conser-
vation and management of floodplain resources (Santos, 2005).
It should be noted that, by law, all floodplains are public property. Only user rights 
can be recognized in them; land-use regulations are quite restrictive (Benatti, 2005). Ho-
wever, with no government authority to enforce rules, individual landowners cannot be 
forced to enter into collective agreements and comply with provisions that they oppose. 
The Pro-Várzea Project identified land tenure as a strategic issue for the sustai-
nable management of the floodplains. Its staff argues that there is a need for a new land 
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tenure policy that recognizes jointly individual and collective use rights to floodplain 
lakes and grasslands. This policy must also reinforce co-management arrangements and 
institutions developed over the previous decade. In July 2006, INCRA (National Institute 
for Colonization and Land Reform) initiated a new settlement and land tenure policy in 
a floodplain area. A pilot project was then initiated in the Santarém (Figure 1) area. It 
was based on a “Agro-extractive Settlement Project” model (PAE), originally designed 
for traditionally settled areas in which local populations engage in both extraction and 
agriculture (Benatti, 2005). One condition imposed by the District Attorney’s office 
on the planned new land tenure standards was that they should include pre-existing 
fishing agreements and institutions. Previously exiting local institutions designed for the 
co-management of floodplain resources are thus being adapted to the new policy and 
institutional framework represented by the PAEs.
The MPA has gone through five ministers since its creation in 2008 – one per 
year. There has been a predictable lack of continuity in its policies. As a consequence, 
its action is weak and its experience in implementing and evaluating policies targeting 
the sustainability of fishery stocks or the financing of infrastructure is far below expec-
tations. In 2015, the MPA was abolished and its functions transferred to the Ministry of 
Agriculture (industrial fisheries) and the Ministry of Agrarian Development (artisanal 
fisheries). Pilot initiatives examined in this article are an opportunity for the improvement 
of innovative fishery policies.
4. Examining selected experiences 
Our research shows that fisheries management in the Amazon basin, in general 
terms, has been inefficient, as it stipulates rules but does not enforce them. The Federal 
Government experiments with participatory management, i. e., with the decentralization 
of decision-making and management, but it hurts innovation by holding on to a centrali-
zing role typical of command and control instruments. Within this model, governmental 
agencies do not have enough human and financial resources to carry out participatory 
management and fail to respond adequately to social demands. At the same time, they 
are typically tardy or absent, even in the matters related to command and control (Ot-
suki, 2011).
In 2001 IBAMA created a Voluntary Environmental Agents Program that helps its 
activities in the fields of environmental education and management of protected areas. 
This legislation was also extended to voluntary community agents engaged in the enfor-
cement of fishing agreements (IBAMA, 2001). The program started with investments 
in training and empowering voluntary agents, but it came to a virtual end after several 
conflicts involving IBAMA, voluntary agents and community members.
Figure 3 displays the decline of “pirarucu” stocks resulting from lack of patrolling 
and enforcement of management rules. The three fishing agreements regulated in the 
municipality of Manoel Urbano in early 2005 brought an increase of 89% in populations 
of “pirarucu” between 2005 and 2009. Since 2009, the state government has given priority 
to an aquaculture program and canceled supporting the management of natural lakes 
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and fishing agreements. Coupled with weak enforcement of IBAMA, illegal access and 
use of “pirarucu” reserves led to social conflicts and the decline of these populations, i.e. 
a reduction of 89.7% between 2009-2013.
Figure 3. “Pirarucu” stocks recorded in managed lakes located in the municipality 
of Manoel Urbano, 2005-2013
Source: SEAPROF/AC.
In this context, conflicts involving local subsistence fishermen, “outside” com-
mercial fishermen, and floodplains landowners proliferated. Riverside communities 
then moved towards informal community agreements. From 1987 to 1996, at least 35 
informal fishing agreements were recorded among 72 communities belonging to a single 
user organization, the Z-20 Fishermen Colony, in Santarém. Most agreements were signed 
specifically for low water seasons, when pressures on stocks increase. However, there is 
a crucial point: the exclusion of fishermen from other regions is not legally supported, 
as Brazilian law considers rivers as public rights of way. Nobody can close them down to 
any actor (Azevedo & Apel, 2004).
Aquino (2007) evaluated fishing agreements implemented in the state of Amazonas. 
From 1995 to 2006, 35 fishing agreements were undersigned by IBAMA. A sample of 214 
fishermen involved in their implementation responded that participatory management 
improved (60%), conflicts were reduced (58%), and fishing productivity increased (72%). 
However 71% responded that patrolling and enforcement were inexistent or inefficient. 
The IARA Project – Management of Fishery Resources in the Middle Amazon, 
carried out by IBAMA, was important for managerial improvement (IBAMA, 1995). It 
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was implemented in the Amazonian states of Pará and Amazonas, from 1991 to 1995. 
Other organizations have collaborated, as was the case of national research institutes, 
local governments and Fishermen Colonies. As a by-product, it developed an important 
socio-economic and environmental database and empowered local institutions. 
From 1994 to 2013, a partnership between the non-governmental organizations 
IPAM (Amazon Institute for Environmental Research) and WWF supported the Várzea 
Project in the development of a fisheries co-management system for the Lower Amazon 
region. This effort went through three overlapping phases. In the first, the Várzea Pro-
ject personnel worked with IBAMA to develop criteria and procedures for transforming 
community fishing agreements into formal regulations. In the second, this model was 
adapted to cattle ranching on floodplain grasslands, the second major common pool 
resource of the floodplain. In the third, these two kinds of co-management regulations 
were integrated into new land tenure and settlement policy for floodplain communities, 
based on the Agro-extractive Settlement Project (the aforementioned PAE), a type of 
settlement designed for rubber tappers and other traditional communities (McGrath et 
al., 2008).
Together with IBAMA, the Regional Fishing Councils, created by the Várzea 
Project, have an important role in command and control. Initially, IBAMA resisted these 
agreements, considering them a threat to its authority. However, given growing conflicts 
and thanks to research results that allowed the improvement of management systems, 
IBAMA concluded that a more participatory approach was acceptable (IBAMA, 2003a).
In 2003, IBAMA published an ordinance defining criteria for undersigning fishing 
agreements. Agreements were defined as “a set of specific norms, resulting from consensus 
agreements among the users of fishing resources found in a certain geographical area, 
or […] a set of rules established by riverside communities in order to define access to 
and forms of use of the fishing resource in a specific region” (IBAMA, 2003b). IBAMA’s 
ordinance 29/2003 acknowledged community-based fishing management initiatives and 
opened the way for their integration into the formal regulatory structure. It forbids rules 
that exclude “outsiders”, but supports the adoption of rules accepted by both locals and 
“outsiders 
The goal of these agreements is to control fishing pressure on local lake systems. 
Rarely do they specify catch limits or minimum fish sizes, measures that are more difficult 
to enforce. While few agreements seek to ban commercial fishing entirely, many seek to 
inhibit it. A central concern of floodplain fishermen is to maintain satisfactory productivity 
with the gear at their disposal (McGrath et al., 2004).
A second important feature of the agreements is that, in contrast with conventional 
policies that protect fish during spawning seasons, most target the low water season, when 
fish are trapped in smaller water bodies and thus more vulnerable to overexploitation. 
Local fishermen believe that rising water levels that coincide with the spawning season 
provide adequate natural protection. Typical measures during the low water season include 
the banning of gill nets and, in some cases, restrictions on sales outside the communities. 
Restrictions on fishing gear during the flood season, on the other hand, are rare and tend 
to be site specific (McGrath et al., 2002).
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Agreements in effect in Santarém include regulations on the use of floodplains for 
fisheries, agriculture and ranching. Studies show that water buffalo herds grew fourfold 
in less than ten years, causing significant impacts on floodplain soils and on crops in the 
low water season (Azevedo & Apel, 2004). “Buffalo agreements” are being discussed with 
the communities, in order to achieve the integrated management of floodplain resources. 
In response to complaints from communities unable to solve cattle conflicts, a working 
group was formed by the Public Attorney’s office in the pilot region of Santarém. The goal 
was to adapt the approach adopted for co-management of lake fisheries to the regulation 
of cattle grazing. Under the supervision of the Public Attorney’s office, legally binding 
contracts, called “Terms of Conduct Adjustment”, are negotiated between cattle owners 
and other residents, defining rules for raising cattle and water buffalo on floodplains. 
These agreements define periods for cattle grazing in community grasslands and specify 
compensation for crop damages caused by cattle (McGrath et al., 2008).
5. Advances and challenges 
Regulating fishing activities in the Amazon region is no easy task. Any measure 
issued by the government tends to fail if it lacks a strong participation of resource users. 
The main cause of non-compliance is the lack of ownership by users who are not con-
sidered in planning, management and monitoring processes, traditionally carried out by 
the state. Fishing agreements mean that civil society is developing an alternative to the 
conventional model.
Surprisingly, most agreement documents are fairly sketchy about how monitoring 
and enforcement should happen. Few define exactly who is responsible for enforcement 
and how control is to be carried out, at the most mentioning vaguely the role of community 
members or leaders (McGrath et al., 2004). Agreements that predict sanctions frequently 
specify progressively heavier penalties, from verbal warnings given to first-time offenders 
to apprehension of gear and formal filing of complaints with IBAMA, in the case of repeat 
offenders. Frequently, gear is either held until the end of the “no catch season” or turned 
over to the local Fisherman Colony or IBAMA (McGrath et al., 2003).
The main limitations of these agreements are their weak organizational base, the 
absence of mechanisms to insure representation of all major stakeholders, and the lack of 
an explicit organizational structure for monitoring and enforcement. A related problem 
is how to achieve representation in the process of defining and approving agreements. 
Typically, interested individuals initiate the process, involving members of neighboring 
communities. A mutually acceptable document is eventually produced, but opponents and 
non-participants tend not to recognize the agreement (McGrath et al., 2004). If commer-
cially oriented fishermen are the opponents, agreements are fatally flawed at the inception.
To address the combined problems of the organizational base and representation, the 
Várzea Project focused first on creating intercommunity councils for major lake systems 
(McGrath et al., 2004). These Regional Fisheries Councils are composed by representa-
tives of all communities sharing the same lake system. They take on the responsibility 
(together with the Santarém Fishermen Colony) for defining, approving and implementing 
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local agreements. Through an iterative process in which proposals are developed at the 
community level, discussed at the council, made into a common proposal, evaluated and 
amended, a definitive version is finally reached and approved by the Regional Council 
and participating communities. While this does not guarantee adequate representation, it 
does insure that all communities have roughly equal participation and provides abundant 
opportunities for anyone to participate (McGrath et al., 2003). Azevedo & Apel (2004) 
recorded an increase in the number of representatives and involved communities in the 
Regional Councils created, as well as an expanded degree of organization and ability to 
solve conflicts.
Another challenge lies in monitoring and enforcement. As noted earlier, most agre-
ements do not detail relevant procedures. Monitoring tends to be haphazard. It depends 
on the irregular patrol of lakes, typically conducted by a few community members, while 
the great majority evades the task. While this may work for dealing with the occasional 
incursions of outsiders, it is insufficient for dealing with “inside” violators - members of 
the community itself. In this case, the informality and lack of representation of patrols and 
leadership leave those who identify violators vulnerable to charges of partiality, confusing 
the issues and eroding credibility. 
Policy-oriented learning plays an important issue for decision-makers who are 
confronted with complex social problems. Linking policies to implementation and ex-
pected outcomes of the agreements, which then in turn can be monitored, can support 
learning. Unfortunately, the use of monitoring information is often diffuse and indirect 
(Hermans et al., 2013)
As a participant of one of the nine fishing agreements in force in Santarém, the 
community of São Miguel island exemplifies a extreme situation in which commercial 
fishing and some fishing gear have been banned for more than fifteen years. Studies fo-
cusing the “pirarucu” show that the output in these managed lakes climbed to 4.7 times 
higher than in unmanaged lakes (Crossa, 2002). In general, Santarém lakes protected 
by agreements have a 60% higher productivity then that of unmanaged lakes (Almeida 
et al., 2002).
In the Sustainable Development Reserve of Mamirauá, between 1999 when the 
system was implemented and 2007, the adult pirarucu population in managed lakes 
almost tripled from 4500 to 12 000 individuals, while the number of fishers more than 
doubled from 40 to over 100 (Castello et al., 2011b). The Maraã fishery, also in the RDS 
Mamirauá, increased from 50 fishers and a total catch of 5.5 tons/year, to 510 fishers and 
a total catch of 119 tons between 2002 and 2009 (Amaral et al. ,2011).
The lessons learned in the Sustainable Development Reserve of Mamirauá were 
replicated in two other reserves in the state of Amazonas. The first was the Baixo Juruá 
Extractive Reserve, where “pirarucu” stocks increased by 142% (between 2006 and 2011) 
and income reached about US$ 26,000, in 2011, involving 50 families. The second was the 
Jutaí River Extractive Reserve, where stocks increased by 147 % between 2005 and 2011. 
The Pyrá Project – Aquatic and Floodplains Resources Integrated Program – in 
the municipality of Manacapurú (Figure 1), generated two ordinances, in 2002, regulat-
ing the use of two local lakes. Each agreement involves about ten riverside communities 
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and creates a “Local Council for the Use of Lakes”, in charge of regulating fishing (gear 
restrictions and three-year bans on the “pirarucu” catch), timber extraction, the burning 
of grass, and the use of pesticides (Rodrigues, 2011).
The Upper Purus Project – Adaptive Management of Community Fisheries – 
started to operate in 2003 in the municipalities of Manoel Urbano and Sena Madureira 
(Figure 1), along the Purus River. The institutional improvement of the local Fishermen 
Colony and the training of state-employed extension technicians allowed a participa-
tory assessment that helped set community agendas, later discussed in a Municipal 
Fishing Forum. These fora – bringing together fishermen colonies, IBAMA, the state 
government of Acre, municipal governments and NGOs – approved six proposals 
for fishing agreements and suggested a system of voluntary monitoring. In Manoel 
Urbano lake productivity increased, i.e., there was a 44.79 % increase in catchment 
per unit of effort (CPUE), considering the period 2005-2008 (Oviedo, 2011). Partici-
pants and user groups are now trying to apply this methodology to other communities 
in the state of Acre. The first such initiative happened in the municipality of Feijó 
(Figure 1), in which six proposals for fishing agreements were regulated by the state 
environmental agency (IMAC). “Pirarucu” management started there in 2008. By 
2015, a stable population of pirarucus around 378 individuals was recorded. Thus, 
many agreements have had positive effects on stock maintenance, catch increase and 
conflict avoidance/resolution. 
6. Final remarks
Participatory management systems tend to have fairly high opportunity costs from 
the perspective of users, when compared to conventional systems. They must engage 
actively in the management process, attend meetings, draft rules, maintain infrastruc-
ture and patrol lakes. The challenge is how to deter or detain violators. In the Amazon 
region, these activities tend to be quite costly, for several reasons. Many lake systems 
are huge, up to 100 km across, and fuel is expensive and hard to obtain. Participation in 
local management activities thus demands a considerable investment of time in collective 
decision making, harvesting, processing, patrolling and travelling to and from meetings. It 
also involves significant financial expenses. There are no mechanisms for covering these 
costs. Funding agencies usually have no interest in proposals for regional (or community) 
management systems of natural resources. They are focused on high scales and widespread 
threats such as commodity depletion, deforestation and climate change.
A second challenge is the requirement that local lake fisheries remain open to 
outsiders. While agreements specify how and when to fish, they cannot specify who can 
fish. As stated, Brazilian law considers all water bodies open to navigation. However, 
this interpretation confuses two fundamentally distinct issues: navigational rights and 
access rights to the fish in the water. Navigation has no specific effect on the resource, 
while fishing does.
There are reasons for insisting on some degree of accessibility by outsiders, espe-
cially by urban-based commercial fishermen. IBAMA’s veto to the exclusion of outsiders, 
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although based on the law, undermines two basic tenets of the theory of collective action 
(Ostrom, 1990; 1998): (1) the clear-cut definition of the group of users and (2) the 
right of users to the results of their own labor, without competition from free riders. As 
the matter stands now, anyone can fish in managed lakes and can have access to their 
improved resources, but outsiders do not share the obligations and costs of maintaining 
the system. Thus, those who invest in lake management compete with all other users to 
obtain a share of whatever benefits their efforts generate. From a theoretical perspective, 
this uncertainty alone is enough to ensure the failure of the entire management effort, as 
in the case of the free riders that undermine collective action (Olson, 1965).
As mentioned earlier, restrictions on gear and boat size may induce outsiders not 
to travel long distances to fish in a particular lake. The downside is that these kinds of 
restrictions also affect the efficiency of local fishing efforts (as local fishermen must spend 
time controlling outsiders) and thus impose an additional cost on those participating in 
fishing agreements. Furthermore, the present system has no mechanisms by which out-
siders could share maintenance costs. In fact, managing groups are specifically barred 
from charging user fees. Such fees would make outsiders pay their share for resource ma-
nagement and could be used to compensate community members for the time invested 
in management activities. In the absence of such a mechanism, managing groups resort 
to fundraising events, such as raffles, bingos and soccer games.
INCRA’s pilot initiative for a new land tenure policy in Amazonian floodplains, 
the PAEs, could solve the main structural problems plaguing the co-management sys-
tem - namely enforcement and the impossibility of excluding outsiders. The exclusion 
of outsiders and user fees would reduce free riding and insure compensation for those 
who invest in the system, two basic conditions for long-term institutional sustainability. 
Logistical and financial difficulties are exacerbated by problems involving enforce-
ment. Efficient mechanisms for punishing violators and solving conflicts are thus another 
challenge for participatory management. Voluntary agents and IBAMA field staff have 
not met the challenge. This can be attributed in part to the lack of resources to undertake 
patrols, but, more importantly, it reflects the fact that IBAMA agents do not easily accept 
sharing authority with community members.
An additional challenge concerns monitoring and evaluating the status of the 
fishery and the impact of rules. Collecting information is a vital part of creating a local 
sense of ownership and an understanding of how regulations help attain concerted goals. 
This information is also essential for achieving performance indicators, so that users can 
see the impacts of their efforts, reinforcing their motivation for managing the system. 
Fishing agreements usually do not include information-gathering procedures. Agreements 
do not allocate funding for performance monitoring in order to determine whether they 
are working. This may be due to the fact that local populations do not collect data on a 
regular basis and to the extra costs implied by data collection. Their perceptions rely mostly 
on non-systematic empirical observations. However, government agents do not engage 
in monitoring either, nor have specific funds and tools been set-aside for this purpose. 
The NGO IPAM is working with the Federal University of Pará, in the municipality of 
Santarém, to train community members, based on the “barefoot ecologists” approach 
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(Prince, 2003), in which community members collect field data on a regular basis, with 
the support of university tools and protocols.
The major finding is that considerable progress was made over the last ten years 
in the direction of a participatory management system for fisheries in the Brazilian Ama-
zon region. This provides an important example of how diverse groups - communities, 
Fishermen Colonies, NGO’s, government agencies, international donor agencies, and 
international conservation organizations - can work together to develop a new grassroots 
approach to management, defending local resources and livelihoods. It also illustrates the 
capacity of participants to learn from the process and to adjust the model.
Implementing fishing agreements is a long-term process. There is no single solution 
for the Amazon region as a whole. Nonetheless, there is a network of institutions and 
arrangements - formal, and informal - operating in many different and complementary 
areas. The current legal and institutional framework is mostly favorable to participatory 
solutions. Some sensitive aspects have been identified and should guide future research - 
what to do with users who lack favorable conditions of access and participation (especially 
commercial fishermen), how to ensure the continuous commitment of local fishermen, 
and how to implement a participatory monitoring system.
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Abstract: Fisheries become undermined as floodplains suffer increasing pressure from in-
frastructure, pollution, changes in climate and over-extraction. For Amazonian riverside 
communities, less fish in the rivers and lakes means empty pockets and empty stomachs. 
This article uses common pool resource theory to analyze the origins and workings of 
collective fishing agreements in the Brazilian Amazon floodplains. As commercial fisheries 
expanded in the mid-1990s, experiences in community-managed lakes emerged in seve-
ral locations, as a promising example of participatory grassroots management. Findings 
show that agreements yield considerable improvements, although their effectiveness is 
threatened by the weak vigilance and monitoring and by the lack of effectiveness of land 
tenure regulation. The article suggests that governmental agencies should support these 
agreements by developing (or adapting) mechanisms aiming at the decentralization of 
public decisions and management. Their failure may lead to changes in ecological pro-
cesses, reduction of fishing stocks, and social-environmental conflicts. 
Key words: participatory management / fishing agreements / grassroots management / 
common pool resources / Amazon region / Brazil
Resumo: A pesca fica prejudicada quando as várzeas sofrem crescentes pressões de in-
fraestrutura, poluição, mudanças climáticas e sobrepesca. Para comunidades ribeirinhas 
da Amazônia, isso pode significar menos peixes nos rios e lagos, o que leva a bolsos e 
estômagos vazios. Este artigo usa a teoria dos recursos comuns para analisar as origens e 
o funcionamento dos acordos coletivos de pesca assinados por habitantes das várzeas da 
Amazônia brasileira. Como a pesca comercial se expandiu em meados dos anos 1990, as 
experiências envolvendo lagos geridos pelas comunidades locais surgiram em vários locais, 
como um exemplo promissor de gestão participativa de base. Os resultados mostram que 
os acordos geraram melhorias consideráveis, embora a sua eficácia esteja ameaçada pela 
fraqueza do monitoramento e da fiscalização e pela falta de eficácia da regulamentação da 
posse da terra. O artigo sugere que as agências governamentais devem apoiar estes acordos 
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por meio do desenvolvimento (ou adaptação) dos mecanismos que visam a descentralização 
das decisões públicas e da gestão. O fracasso deles pode levar a mudanças nos processos 
ecológicos, à redução dos estoques pesqueiros e a conflitos sócio-ambientais.
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comuns; Amazônia; Brasil.
Resumen: La pesca se ve perjudicada cuando las llanuras de inundación sufren presiones 
crecientes de infraestructura, contaminación, cambio climático y sobrepesca. Para las co-
munidades ribereñas de la Amazonía, esto puede significar menos peces en los ríos y lagos, 
lo que provoca bolsos y estómagos vacíos. Este artículo usa la teoría de los recursos comunes 
para analizar los orígenes y el funcionamiento de los acuerdos colectivos de pesca firmados 
por habitantes de las llanuras de inundación de la Amazonía brasileña. Como la pesca co-
mercial se expandió a mediados del los años 1990, en varios lugares surgieron experiencias 
de lagos gestionados por las comunidades locales, como un ejemplo prometedor de gestión 
participativa. Los resultados muestran que los acuerdos generaron mejoras considerables, 
aunque su eficacia esté amenazada por la debilidad del control y vigilancia y por la falta 
de eficacia de la regulación de la tenencia de tierras. El artículo sugiere que las agencias 
gubernamentales deben apoyar estos acuerdos mediante el desarrollo (o adaptación) de 
los mecanismos que buscan la descentralización de las decisiones públicas y de la gestión. 
El fracaso de dichos acuerdos puede desencadenar cambios en los procesos ecológicos, la 
reducción de los estoques pesqueros y conflictos socioambientales. 
Palabras clave: Gestión participativa; Acuerdos de pesca; Gestión comunitaria; Recursos 
comunes; Amazonía; Brasil.
